

marketplace commerce.<sup>51</sup> Whitmore and other scholars had accepted the Việt chronicle representation of Lê Thánh Tông's reign, as the retrospective written account by literati advisors to establish a contemporary Ming pattern of bureaucratic administration. These past studies depicted Thánh Tông's reign as focal on widespread aristocratic and administrative restructuring intent on strengthening the Thăng Long court against its regionally-entrenched aristocratic rivals.<sup>52</sup>

In a 1461 CE edict, Thánh Tông ordered provincial officials: 'Do not cast aside the roots [agriculture] and pursue the insignificant [trade/commerce]' to ensure internal welfare, and restrict outsiders from entering Đại Việt provinces.<sup>53</sup> He followed in 1465 CE demanding that every six years villages had to submit written records of their human and material resources, to demonstrate that they were effectively productive.<sup>54</sup> A new court agency managed these records, and to increase their productivity villages were specifically charged to promote the construction and proper management of local dikes. In the name of the 'wellbeing' of the people (in contrast to the promotion of trade) he imposed a marketplace code of conduct and standardized weights and measures.<sup>55</sup> Against banditry in the mountain regions and piracy in the Gulf of Tonkin (and thereby stabilize his borders against another potential Ming intervention), in 1469 CE he declared gunpowder weapons a state monopoly, promised promotions to any official who captured pirates, and followed in 1470 CE by sending a naval expedition against pirates in the Gulf of Tonkin.<sup>56</sup> Combining his aggressive stance relative to protecting sea transit in the Gulf and his efforts to promote agriculture (by supplying additional agricultural labour), he had thirteen men, shipwrecked on the Đại Việt coastline while in transit from Hainan Island to Quinzhou, sent to agricultural colonies.<sup>57</sup>

All these foundational centralizing initiatives culminated in the Đại Việt attack on Champa in 1471 CE, as Thánh Tông sent massive land and sea forces south against the Cham realm to destroy Vijaya.<sup>58</sup> In theory, according to the chronicles, the invasion was intended to secure Đại Việt's southern borderlands against repeated Cham raids, to eliminate the ongoing threats of this 'uncivilized' society, and not to repeat the Việt pattern of the past, e.g., to conquer, loot, seize manpower, and return home with the spoils

of war. In the end Thánh Tông annexed the Vijaya northern borderlands and immediately implemented provincial administrations in the new Đại Việt Quảng Nam province. Despite his lofty ambitions, Thánh Tông took back significant numbers of Chams and resettled them in the Đại Việt Red River delta to colonize new agricultural lands. They were forced to take Vietnamese style names and 'embrace Sinic morality'.<sup>59</sup>

That Champa was still functional after 1471 CE, but with consequences, is demonstrated in a report from the new southern province officials to the Thăng Long court in 1485 CE, wherein they asserted that it was difficult for them to remit tax collections to the court because there were not sufficient ships available. New regulations for the reception of foreign envoys welcome at the Đại Việt court listed Champa among other regional polities, notably Laos, Ayutthaya, Java, and Melaka.<sup>60</sup> In 1485 CE, Thánh Tông complained to the Ming court that seagoing links between Champa and the Ryukyu Islands had resulted in a raid on the southern Đại Việt coastline. That he was proactive in his regional maritime initiatives following his destruction of the Jiaozhi Yang network is illustrated by several complaints to the Ming court: one from Melaka in 1481 CE asserted that Đại Việt had interfered with their embassy to the Ming court.<sup>61</sup> Kauthara and Pāṇḍuraṅga used their remaining connections to Guangzhou to promote a Ming intervention against Đại Việt, which the Ming court refused, saying this 'involved merchants and the vast maritime region' and this was counter to the Ming restrictions on China's Southern Seas (*Nanyang*) engagements.<sup>62</sup> In 1497 CE, following Lê Thánh Tông's death, Champa tried once more to gain the Ming court's support for the restitution of the Vijaya region, by arguing that 'Xinzhou [Thị Nại] is our country that has long been occupied by An Nam [Đại Việt]', and asked for recognition 'so that in future days [the king's son] can protect the area of Xinzhou port'.<sup>63</sup>

Contrary to collective written evidence that the 1471 CE Đại Việt invasion was the culmination of a centuries old endgame competition between the Cham and Đại Việt polities over the control of their borderlands, but with diplomatic fallout, the new shipwreck and archaeological evidence negates the prior conclusion that Lê Thánh Tông's aggression went beyond a 'traditional' victory only in his